{"id":11257,"date":"2022-11-18T07:30:25","date_gmt":"2022-11-18T07:30:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/focus.cbbc.org\/?p=11257"},"modified":"2022-11-19T13:20:13","modified_gmt":"2022-11-19T13:20:13","slug":"the-20th-party-congress-people-policies-and-prospects","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/focus.cbbc.org\/the-20th-party-congress-people-policies-and-prospects\/","title":{"rendered":"China’s future after the 20th Party Congress"},"content":{"rendered":"

The 20th Party Congress showed Xi Jinping doubling down on existing policy initiatives with little sign of major adjustments, but economic and structural developments will put growing pressure on Xi to deliver on his reform agenda<\/span><\/h2>\n

The 20th Party Congress might well go down as one of the most significant in recent Chinese history. The reason for this is less due to Xi Jinping staying on for a third term, and more to do with the glaring discrepancy between the message that the leadership wanted to convey and the one which was perceived by audiences both domestically and globally.\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Xi wanted to stress stability but to many, there appeared to be a reinforced sense of uncertainty, not least because of his explicit support for China\u2019s highly disruptive zero-Covid<\/a> policy. Xi also wanted to show continuity, but again, there was a perception of disruption, especially regarding his predecessor Hu Jintao, who \u2013 in one of the most extraordinary moments of the Congress \u2013 was be removed from the stage for reasons still not fully explained. Finally, by surrounding himself with apparently unremarkable allies and long-term collaborators, Xi raised doubts about the prospects of much-needed reforms \u2013 many of them promised for years but yet to be delivered.\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

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But all is not quite doom and gloom. Xi\u2019s opening speech \u2013 a sort of CCP manifesto for the next five years \u2013 was, to an extent, anti-climactic. It included little that had not been said before, belying the alarmist headlines in many Western media. Li Qiang \u2013 although somewhat tarnished by the chaotic Shanghai lockdown<\/a> earlier this year \u2013 is expected to be the new Premier and has a generally business-friendly reputation; he is expected to continue his predecessor\u2019s policies of supply-side reforms and trade liberalisation.\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Furthermore, the promotion of former Minister for Environmental Protection Chen Jining \u2013 an Imperial College graduate who spent ten years in the UK \u2013 to Party Secretary of Shanghai, means that Xi\u2019s ambitious Net Zero<\/a> goals and green development agenda is now a key performance indicator for Party officials eager to climb the career ladder. Regarding foreign policy, the appointment of the current Chinese Ambassador to the United States Qin Gang to the Party\u2019s Central Committee (CC) \u2013 suggesting that he will be promoted to Foreign Minister at the next Two Meetings (Lianghui) in March 2023 \u2013 also indicates a willingness to manage US-China relations more closely. It is worth remembering that current Foreign Minister Wang Yi \u2013 a Japanologist \u2013 entered office at the height of the conflict over the Diaoyu islands and subsequently managed to put the bilateral relationship between the two neighbours on a more stable footing. Qin\u2019s appointment could therefore be seen as a sign that Beijing is clearly worried about the friction between the two superpowers and wants to defuse tensions before it\u2019s too late.<\/span><\/p>\n