{"id":7220,"date":"2021-03-09T10:50:43","date_gmt":"2021-03-09T10:50:43","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/focus.cbbc.org\/?p=7220"},"modified":"2025-04-23T09:55:29","modified_gmt":"2025-04-23T09:55:29","slug":"paul-french-discusses-chinas-maritime-silk-road-with-geoffrey-gresh","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/focus.cbbc.org\/paul-french-discusses-chinas-maritime-silk-road-with-geoffrey-gresh\/","title":{"rendered":"Paul French discusses China’s Maritime Silk Road with Geoffrey Gresh"},"content":{"rendered":"

Paul French interviews Geoffery Gresh \u2013 author of \u2018To Rule Eurasia\u2019s Waves: The New Great Power Competition at Sea\u2019 \u2013 about the Maritime Silk Road, transparency and the UK’s potential role<\/h2>\n

Geoffrey F. Gresh\u2019s \u2018To Rule Eurasia\u2019s Waves: The New Great Power Competition at Sea\u2019 (Yale University Press) is a sweeping study of the situation concerning the vital sea lanes running from Asia to North America, Europe and the UK. The book considers the rise of Russia, India and China as major shipping nations, transporting containerised goods crucial to our trade relationship, as well as the ways in which they have become increasingly involved in protecting those international sea lanes.<\/p>\n

The need for Chinese exports to be delivered around the globe in a seamless logistical chain, as well as vital imports of energy into China to keep the economy humming, mean that Beijing is keen to see the country becoming dominant both in shipbuilding (as it now is) as well as fleet operation. These aspirations are encapsulated in China\u2019s Maritime Silk Road, a series of policies that have ramifications for Britain, too. Gresh is professor of international relations at the National Defence University in Washington, and as such, the views expressed here are those of the interviewee alone and do not represent official policy or his employer.<\/p>\n

Forty percent of China’s economy relies on trade and a dependency on energy imports. In the book you say that China will leverage its investment in the region\u2019s ports for its own geo-strategic and geoeconomics interests \u2013 where will we see this play out in the coming years?<\/h4>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

The 2017 establishment of a Chinese military base in Djibouti signalled just how important China viewed the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. Moreover, Djibouti serves multiple purposes for the Chinese: It is an important anchor on the far western edges of the Indian Ocean; it is an essential entryway into Africa\u2019s largely untapped markets and China\u2019s other critical investments; and it is an increasingly critical perch and catapult into the Red Sea, Mediterranean, and the broader Middle East. Certainly, Djibouti is just one connection among many that the Chinese are developing. Further to the north and east of Djibouti near the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf, for example, China is developing Gwadar in Pakistan. Gwadar\u2019s development has experienced significant developmental and security obstacles of late, but Gwadar could one day offer another vital maritime logistics hub and potential base for easier access to the Gulf, as well as a starting point along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.<\/p>\n

\"launchpad<\/a><\/p>\n

China\u2019s investment in its domestic port facilities and infrastructure has been massive right along its coast. This was partly based on projections of around 5% per annum growth in containerized trade out of China. But with trade disputes, a decoupling from China in some areas and the traumatic shock of Covid-19, is it possible China has over-invested in the MSR?<\/h4>\n

At some level, I agree that we will see certain shifts in trading patterns between China and other countries, especially in a post-Covid world. But that said, at present, more than 90% of the world\u2019s goods transit the sea, bringing into relief the continued importance of the stability and security of the global commons.<\/p>\n

Due to Eurasia\u2019s growing and developing population, India and China in particular will likely still need to reach outward in their hunt for more natural resources, for example, to fuel their growing economies. As a result, I believe that maritime trade will remain an important element in any country\u2019s orientation, especially that of China, and that it will necessitate the continued need for more investment in projects such as the Maritime Silk Road. China has indeed experienced significant difficulties in the expansion and current management of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), but the development of a maritime trade and logistics network via the MSR is already well underway with certain proven successes across the sea lanes of southern Eurasia.<\/p>\n